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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff-seller to collect the purchase 
price of large-equi:EJllent tires, interest thereon, and attorneys' fees 
fran the defendant-buyer who failed to make timely payment thereof on 
its open account with the plaintiff. 
DISPC\SITIOO IN THE L<l'IER COURT 
The Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, the 
Honorable David Sam presiding, granted partial slllllllary judgment to the 
plaintiff wherein the Court awarded the principal purchase price and 
interest thereon to the plaintiff.. The Court also granted partial 
surrmary judgment to the defendant wherein the Court denied the plaintiff's 
claim for attorneys' fees. 
RELIEF SOOOHT IN THE PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks reversal of simmary judgment granted the defen-
dant denying the plaintiff'.s claim for attorneys' fees, judgment for 
cost in the Court below and on appeal, and, if necessary, remand for the 
determination of the proper airount of such fees and costs. 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
1. The plaintiff, Johnson Tire Service, Inc., is a merchant which 
sells tires and related products. The defendant, Thorn, Inc., is a ready-
mix concrete merchant which renders products and services relating to the 
construction industry. Since the late 1960s, the plaintiff has sold tires, 
as well as related products and services, to the defendant on an open 
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account. 
2. During the time in which the parties have been doing business 
with one another, the defendant custanarily ordered the goods on an 
' 
authorized purchase order which frequently did not contain any terms 
except a description of the goods. Johnson Tire, the plaintiff, acknow-
ledged and accepted the buyer's offer to purchase by sending an invoice 
which, if signed by' an emPloyee of the defendant, was followed by delivery 
of the tires ordered. 
3. In approximately 1973, the plaintiff modified its invoices to 
reflect the exact terms and conditions of the sales agreement. Since 
that time all invoices sent to the defendant and other purchasers contained 
the follO'o111ing legend: 
TITLE REMAINS WITH SELLER UNTIL PAID. BUYER PRCMISES TO PAY 
J.l!Xl)UNT Kr SPRINGVILLE, UTAH. FINANCE CHARGE AT .ANNUAL PER-
CENTAGE RATE OF 18 PERCENT CHARGED ON PN:l At-DUNT UNPAID AFTER 
30 DAYS FRa'4 DATE HEREOF. BUYER AG.REES TO PAY COSTS OF COLLFX:TION, 
INCLUDING ~LE ATIDRNEY FEES, WITH OR WITHOUT SUIT. 
4. At the beginning of 1978, the defendant's account with the 
plaintiff shO'o111ed an unpaid ~lance of $567.70, As additional purchases 
were made during the year, the unpaid balance gradually increased. 
5. In May of 1978, with an unpaid-balance of $1,406.34 in its 
account with the plaintiff, the defendant ordered four heavy-duty Michelin 
equiµnent tires (custanarily used on front-end loaders) at a cost of 
$6,020.79, includi.ng taxes. 
6. The plaintiff sent regular monthly statements to the defendant, 
but received only partial payments. 
7. Representatives of the plaintiff met with a representative 
of the defendant, Jerry Thorn, in August, 1978 and requested that the ac-
-2-
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count be paid in full. Mr. Thorn pranised to have the account fully 
paid by October, 1978. 
B. During the August, 1978 meeting, Mr. Thorn objected to the 
rate of interest or service charge added to its ac6ount, but n0 agree-
ment was made to change that rate. 
9. During the course of dealings between the parties, the plaintiff 
has consistently applied the defendant's payments first against accrued 
service charges ("interest") and then against principal. Unpaid service 
charges have been added to principal for the caipltation of subsequent 
service charges. 
10. The defendant's open account with the plaintiff, as of the 
time of the plaintiff's motion for sU11111ary judgment (February 10; 1979), 
reflected an unpaid balance of $567.70 for 1977, purchases of $7,240.44, 
service charges ("interest") of $950.21, and total payments or credits 
of $1,590.26, leaving an unpaid balance of $7,168.09. The last payment 
prior to that time was received on December 22, 1978. 
11. In January of 1979, the plaintiff' referred the defendant's 
account to its attorney for collection for a contingent fee of 25% of 
all amounts collected if suit were required. The defendant failed to 
respond to demands by the plaintiff and by plaintiff's attorney, and 
suit was ccmnenced in the Fourth Judicial District Court in Utah Co1mty. 
12. At all times pertinent herein, the defendant, by and through 
its agents, were aware of the content of the plaintiff's invoices. The 
provisions on the bottan of the plaintiff's invoices were discussed with 
Jerry Thorn in his office at Thorn, Inc. Mr. Thorn, who represented him-
self as having powers to negotiate in behalf of the defendant and who is 
-3-
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an attorney, was well aware that such terms were part of the bargain 
with the plaintiff. Objection to those terms was not made within a 
reasonable time. 
13. On all forms used by the plaintiff, the provisions regarding 
the service charge were not in "fine print", but rather in extra bold 
lettering showing the annual percentage rate. The bold lettering would 
attract a merchant's attention to the provisions for the interest charges 
and the costs of collection, including reasonable attorneys' fees. 
14. The terms of credit in the plaintiff's invoices were standard 
and are typically used by other merchants in this state, including the 
defendant. 
15. The plaintiff's partial stmil\ary judgment for principal and 
interest was satisfied and all garnishments therefor were released upon 
receipt of payment fran the defendant in the amount of $7, 799. 1 O on 
July 30, 1979. [Substantiated by the District Court file.) 
16. On the principal sale of $6,020.79, the plaintiff was to 
have made sane $250 profit. While it recovered the principal, the 
plaintiff had attorneys' fees of sane $1,950 which, although reasonable, 
put the non-breaching plaintiff-seller in the position of being forced 
to sell goods at a loss because of the defendant-buyer's delinquency in 
making payment. [Not in the record, but added to focus the plaintiff's 
arguments.] 
SUBST.ANTIATIOO FRCM REX:DRD: Unless otherwise indicated, the facts 
herein cited are substantiated principally fran the plaintiffs Statement 
of Facts in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supplemented by the Affidavit submitted therewith and the plaintiff's 
Reply Statement which were adopted by the Court in its Findings of Fact. 
-4-
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STA'l'EMENl' OF POINTS 
POINT OOE: BINDnxi ADDITIOOAL ~- Since both the plaintiff 
and the defendant are merchants, the provision in the plaintiffs 
invoices regarding attorneys' fees established a contractual ob-
ligation on thedefendant to pay the plaintiff's attorneys' fees 
under the provisions of § 70A-2-207 of the Utah Uniform Callnercial 
Code (cited "Utah U::C"). 
POINT 'BID: nt:IDENI'AL I>J.l.M.AGES. The District Court erred in 
failing to award its attorneys' fees as "incidental damages" (to the 
plaintiff - seller] resulting fran the defendant - buyer's breach 
under the provisions of S 70A-2-710 of the Utah U::C. 
POINT 'IHREE: COURSE OF DEALING. The lower Court should have 
ruled that the parties course of dealings established a contractual 
obligation on the defendant to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees 
under the provisions of §§ 70A-2-208 and 70A~2-202 of the Utah u::c. 
POINT rouR: CXM-m LAW. The lower court inproperly ruled that 
the defendant was not bound to pay the plaintiff's attorneys' fees 
on cOll!K>n principles and inproperly relied on inappropriate precedent 
in its decision. 
-5-
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POINT CNE:: BINDING ADDITICNAL TERMS. 
A. General Rule. For the creation of a binding sales contract, 
Chapter 2 of the Utah Uniform Camnercial Code [§§ ?OA-2-101 et seq., 
hereinafter cited as "Utah UCC"] does not require that the accep-
tance of an offer be limited to the exact terms of the offer. Sec-
tion 70A-2-207 of the Utah UCC provides: 
70A-2-207. Additional terms in acceptance or confirmation. 
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a 
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time 
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms addit-
ional to or different fran those offered or agreed upon, un-
less acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to 
the additional or different terms. 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as pro-
posals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such 
terms becane part of the contract unless: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms 
of the offer; 
(b) they materially alter it; or 
(c) notification of objection to them has already been 
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of 
them is received. 
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the ex-
istence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract 
for sale although the writings of the parties do not other-
wise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the 
particular contract consist of those terms on which the 
writings of the parties agree, together with any supple-
mentary terms incorporated under any other provisions of 
this act. 
The contract involved in this case is for the sale and purchase 
of goods from one merchant to another, and Chapter 2 of the Utah UCC 
and those of its provisions specifically applicable to merchants 
clearly apply. 
The defendant's offer to purchased, memorialized in its purchase 
orders or otherwise, were acknowledged and accepted by the plaintiff's 
invoices which contained additional terms of credit relating to credit 
-6-
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service charge ("interest") and costs of collection, including reas-
onable attorneys' fees. As between these merchants, the teans of 
credit "becane part of the contract" under S 70A-2-207 of the Utah 
UCC since none of the statutory exceptions exists. There is no 
statutory requirement that the seller.' s form of acceptance be signed 
by the buyer or its authorized representative. 
B. No Restricted Offer. The defendant's offer did not ex-
pressly limit the plaintiff's acceptance to the teans shown on its 
purchase order. In fact, the purchase price was not shown on the.def-
endant's purchase orders, but was negotiated and agreed upcrlotherwise. 
C. Material Alteration. Although the statute itself does not 
delineate what types of teans "materially alter" a contract within 
the meaning of § 70A-2-207 (2) (b), the Official Ccmnents* to S 2-207 
of the UCC by the Camiissioners on Uniform State laws contain clear 
guidelines for its interpretation. 
Official Camnents 3 and 4 indicate that the test for material 
alteration is whether the additional provisioos would "result in sur-
prise or hardship if incorporated [into the agreement] without ex-
press awareness by the'other party •••• " Hence, the lower Court erred 
in requiring a signature or other evidence of "express awareness." 
Official Ccmnent 5 to § 2-207 of the UCC states that "a clause 
providing for interest on overdue invoices or fixing the seller's 
*See Appendix B for the full text. 
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standard credit terms where they are within the range of trade practice 
and do not limit any credit bargained for" involves no element of un-
reasonable surprise and is to be incorporated into the contract be-
tween merchants unless timely objection is made. 
Subsection (2) of § 70A-2-207 was sul:lnitted to the Utah legis-
lature with Official Co!!inents which explained that terms of credit on 
an invoice would be binding on a merchant-buyer, and the legislature 
adopted it without modification. 
Merchants in this state, including both the plaintiff and the 
defendant, typically require the payment of the costs of collecting 
a delinquent account, including reasonable attorneys' fees, as well 
as credit service charges, as a part of their standard terms of 
credit. Therefore, the additional terms of credit contained on the 
plaintiffs invoices are within the range of trade usage and do not 
cause any "surprise" or "undue hardship" to the defendant (which 
uses similar terms of credit on its invoices). 
c) Timely Objection. The defendant failed to make objection 
within a reasonable time to the additional terms on the plaintiff's 
invoices as required by §70A-2-207 (2) (c). Such terms were on the 
plaintiff's invoices since 1973, and although the defendant had an 
open account before and after that time, it failed to object to 
those terms until August, 1978 (except perhaps on specific isolated 
transactions not related to this case). 
d) Earlier Precedent. This Court did not discuss or apply the 
Utah UCC in either Spanish Fork Packing Company v. House of Fine 
Meats, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 312, 508 P.2d 1186 (1973) and B & R Supply 
-8-
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Canpany v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972). They 
are inappropriate as precedent in this case where the ua:: clearly 
applies and was raised in the lower Court as the plaintiff's chief 
argument for its claim for attorneys' fees. 
This is a case of first impression, apparently for other juris-
dictions as well as for Utah. Those two cases, and similar cases in 
other jurisdictions, are clearly based on campn law prior to the 
Uniform camiercial Code even though they were decided after its ad-
option. Of course, the Court could not decide in the previous cases 
an issue which was not raised by the parties. 
e) Conclusion. The Court below ruled that the. additional terms 
of credit on the plaintiff's invoices were not binding on the def-
endant without an authorized signature or other evidence of consent. 
The Utah ua:: mandates that such terms are binding as between merch-
ants. Since the offer was not restricted to its terms, since there 
is no material alteration of the a<)'reement causing surprise or undue 
hardship to the defendant, and since the defendant failed to object 
until after five years of receiving the plaintiff's invoices, none 
of the exceptions to § 70A-2-207 of the Utah ua:: applies. 
The current statutory provisions of the Utah ua:: were adopted 
by the legislature to supersede prior statutory and case law. The 
law does not require actual consent but incorporates into contracts 
"canmercial understandings" and the expectations of rrodern merchants. 
(See Official Collnent 2 to § 2-207 of the OX:.] The defendant is 
legally and contractually obligated to pay the plaintiff's attorneys' 
fees. 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT 'MJ: INCIDENI'AL DAMAGES 
A. General Rule. The Official Canment* to § 2-710 of the UCC 
indicates that a buyer is liable to the seller for "all canmercially 
reasonable expenditures made by the seller" as a result of the 
buyer's breach. The clear intent of the law is to make the non-
breaching party whole, not to merely canpensate for the principal 
purchase price. 
B. Plaintiff's ArgtmlE!nt. The plaintiff's expenditure of attor-
neys' fees is a "ccmnercial reasonable" expense which resulted 
directly fran the defendant's refusal to make payment in full on its 
account. 
If attorneys' fees are not awarded as valid incidental damages, 
merchants (such as the plaintiff) will often be forced by delinquent 
buyers (such as the defendant) to sell at a loss because collection 
expenses can easily consume and exceed the profit and even the price 
on the goods sold. 
Although awarding attorneys' fees as incidental damages is in-
consistent with the pre-UCC application of contract law, the Utah 
legislature's clear intent under § 70A-2-710 was to make a non-
breaching seller whole and to make a breaching buyer fully re-
sponsible for all expenses reasonably incurred because of its breach. 
*See Appendix B for the full text. 
-10-
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POINT 'IHREE: CXXJRSE OF DEALIK:iS 
A. General Rule. J.\s provided in §§ 70A-2-202- (a) and 
?OA-2-208 of the Utah OCC, the acquiescence of a party may be 
equivalent to assent W1der Utah contract law. Because the defen-
dant failed to object for several years to the crediting of its 
payments first to current interest and then to unpaid principal 
(including past interest charges), the District Court awarded the 
plaintiff interest, before and after judgment, at the rate shown 
on the plaintiff's invoices and IOOnthly statement. 
"Course of dealings" is analogous to estoppel, and differs 
only in that one party relies on the silent acquiescence of the 
other, rather than on explicit representations. For many years, 
the plaintiff in this case sold goods and extended credit to the 
defendant in reliance on the defendant's acquiesence to the standard 
terms of credit contained in the plaintiff's invoices. 
The Utah OCC was adopted to relax the requirements for a fair 
and enforceable contract. The OCC does not require a signed con-
tract with each purchase. Even at camxm law, printed conditions 
on sales slips were regarded as part of the contract where those 
conditions were expressly made a part thereof or they were so set 
forth and were so related to the writing and the subject matter of 
the agreement as to manifest to the other party an intent that they 
were to be obligatory on him. 77 C.J .s., Sales, § 71. 
B. Application to This case. The defendant accepted goods 
and credit for years knowing of the plaintiff's terms therefor. 
-11-
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[See §§ 1 and 2 of the plaintiff's Reply Statement of Points and 
Authorities dated April 5, 1979.] The defendant's failure to object 
to those terms of credit constitutes acquiescence to those terms. 
The lower Court awarded interest to the plaintiff because of 
the defendant's acquiescence in the plaintiff's billing practice, 
including the caiputation of interest. It is unfair to allow the 
defendant to now claim that it never acquiesced· to pay cost of col-
lection, including reasonable attorneys' fees where the other terms 
of credit had been honored. To hold otherwise would allow long-
term merchant buyers to disregard credit terms at will. 
In short, several years of dealings one with another made both 
parties aware of unwritten but valid expectations which are enforce-
able under §§ 70A-2-202(b) and ?OA-2-208 of the Utah UCC. 
-12-
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POINT FUUR: CCM-m LAW 
A. Prior Cases--Factual Distinctions. The defendant and the 
District Court relied upon the rulings of this Court in two prior 
cases, Spanish Fork Packing eanpany v. House of Fine Meats, Inc., 
29 Utah 2d 312, 508 P.2d 1186 (1973) and B & R Supply CanpanY v. 
Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972). 
In the B & R Supply case the Court ruled that where the buyer's 
attention was never called to the seller's teans of credit printed 
in "small inoonspicuous print" on the seller's.invoices, no oontract 
was created for the payment of attorneys' fees. In the 5panish 
Fork Packing case the Court ruled that where the buyer had never 
read the teans of credit on a seller's invoices, there was no "meet-
ing of the minds" and no enforceable contract for attorneys' fees. 
In the present case, however, the defendant-buyer was made 
aware of the teans of credit contained on the plaintiff-seller's in-
voices and never denied knailedge thereof. In the plaintiff's Reply 
Statement of Points and Authorities, the plaintiff clearly alleged 
that JerryThom, an agent for the defendant and .an attorney, dis-
cussed with representatives of the plaintiff the provisions at the 
bottan of the sales slip and that Mr. Thom was made aware that at-
torneys' fees were part of the contract between the parties. Such 
allegations were never controverted and were adopted by the District 
Court in its Findings of Fact [q.v.J. 
B. Inapposite Precedent. The law applied in the B & R Supply 
and Spanish Fork Packing cases is inconsistent with the caTllX)J'l law . 
and undermines the purpose of contract law. 
-11-
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The dissenting justice in the Spanish Fork Packing case, Justice 
Henriod, described that cased as being one: 
• where actually there is no meeting of the minds, but where 
there is a manifestation of mutual asset which appears to create 
consensual liability by virtue of a sort of estoppel that says 
one is bound if ostensibly he represents sanething without af-
firmatively denying liability therefor,--that he will respond 
ex contractu, if one relies on his representations, either by 
express authority or by implication. Spanish Fork Packing, 
508 P.2d at 1188 (dissent). 
The justice went on to say: 
It is sanewhat ridiculous to conclude that the purchaser-defendant's 
officials did not read the scrcalled "fine print" at the very head 
of the invoice,--sane of which was not as "fine" as asserted. It 
is also amazing to this writer that disclaiming liability for the 
attorney's fee provision because nobody in authority bothered to 
read it or question its obvious implications over a two-year 
period falls squarely within the authorities cited in Slim Olson 
[v. Winegar, 122 Utah 80, 246 P.2d 608 (1952)) based on acquies-
cence in the terms of an agreement by silence. 508 P.2d at 1188 
and 1189 (dissent). 
The Spanish Fork Packing and B & R Supply cases are inconsistent 
with camon-law contract principles, trade usage, and the intent of the 
Utah Uniform Carmercial Code. If those cases are upheld and a similar 
decision is reached in this case, the following legal advice will be 
11Dre frequently given (and followed) in Utah: 
[T)he way to avoid attorney's fees or any other prov1s1on in fine 
print, simply is to ignore it, permit your employees to sign de-
livery invoices on which are terms, that if undesirable, could be 
rejected, say you authorized them to sign for the delivery only 
but not for anything appearing on the invoices, such as weight, 
price, quality and the like, and you will not be responsible for 
any of those items, and you then can put the seller to proof 
dehors the invoice itself, and renege on even the delivery of 
goods itself by saying, for example, that your employee was not 
authorized to establish proof of delivery because that was re-
served to the President of the corporation, who knew and saw 
nothing about the invoice, what was on it, or what his employee's 
signature looked like. 508 P.2d at 1189 (dissent). 
In other words, those cases place an unconscionable burden on a sel-
-14-
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ler and give the buyer the benefit of a bargain without obliging him to 
honor it. 
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CGICLUSIOO 
A. Binding Additional Terms: The lCMer Court improperly disregarded 
§ 70A-2-207 of the Utah U:C both as to interest and attorneys' fees. Since 
the record indicates that there was no material alteration of the parties' 
agreement and that the defendant failed to object to the additional terms 
within a reasonable time, the terms of credit in the plaintiff's invoices 
are a binding part of the sales agreement between the parties. 
B. Incidental Damages: The provisions of § 70A-2-710 require that 
the plaintiff be made whole, and therefore the plaintiff should be reim-
bursed for all costs incurred because of the defendant's breach of its 
pranise to pay on time, including reasonable attorneys' fees. 
C. Course of Dealing: The parties' dealings with each other es-
tablished mutual expectations which the defendant should be obligated 
to follCM and "estopped" fran denying under the provisions of §§ 70A-
2-208 and 70A-2-202 of the Utah UCC. 
D. Carmon Law: The lower court improperly relied on the _§panish 
Fork Packing and B & R Supply cases where the facts in the present case 
distinguish it fran those previous cases, and where the law applied in 
those cases is inconsistent with fairness, trade usage, and the canmon-
law principle of estoppel. 
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APPENDIX "A" 
70A-2-202. Final written expression-Parol or extrinsic evidence.-
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties 
agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties 
as a final expression of their agreement with respect to auch terma u &re 
included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agree-
ment or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or mp-
plemented 
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (section 70A-1-205) or by 
course of performance (section 70A~2-208) ; and 
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the 
writing to have been intended also as a complete and ucluaive 
statement of the terms of the agreement. 
70A-2-207. Additionli.l terms in acceptance or conflrmation.-(1) A 
definite and 1euonable expression of acceptance or a written conftrmati1J11 
which ia sent within a reasonable time operates u an acceptance even though 
it 1tate1 terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, 
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional 
or different terms. 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed u propoul& for addition 
to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract 
unle&B: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
(b) they materially alter it; or 
(c) notification of objection to them bu already been given or is given 
within a reuonable time after notice of them is received. 
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a COD· 
tract is suflicient to eatabliah a contract for ule although the writings of the 
parties do not otherwise e1tabliah a contract. In 1uch cue the terms of the 
particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the par-
ties agree, together with any 1upplementary terms incorporated under uy 
other provisions of thia acL 
70A-2-208. Course of performance or practical CODltnlcticm.-(1) 
Where the contract for aale involves repeated occasions for performance by 
either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and oppor-
tunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted 
or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meu-
ing of the agreement. 
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any mch courae of 
performance, as well as any course of dealing and uuge of trade, shall be 
eonstrued whenever reuonable u consistent with each other; but when 
such construction is unreasonable, express terms shall control courae of 
performance and course of performance shall control both course of dealing 
and uaage of trade (section 70A-1-205). 
(3) Subject to the provisions of the nut section on modification and 
waiver, such course of performance shall be relevant to show a waiver or 
modification of any term inconsistent with such course of performance. 
70A-2-710. Beller'• incidental damagea.-Incidental damage• to· an 
aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable charges! expenses or 
commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and 
custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or 
resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach. 
A-1 
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APPENDIX "B" 
Official Canment to §2-202 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: None. 
Purposes: 
1. This section definitely ~ 
jects: 
-(a) Any aaaumption that be-
cause a writing has been worked 
out which is final on some mat-
ters, it is to be taken as i~clud­
ing all the matters agreed upon; 
(b) The premise that the lan-
guage used has the meaning at-
tributable to such language by 
rules of construction existing in 
the law rather than the meaning 
which arises out of the commer-
cial context in which it was used; 
and 
(c) The requirement that a 
condition precedent to the admis-
sibility of the type of evidence 
specified in paragraph (a) is an 
original determination by the 
court that the language used is 
ambiguous. 
2. Paragraph (a) makes ad-
missible evidence of course of 
dealing, usage of trade and 
course of performance to explain 
or supplement the terms of any 
writing stating the agreement of 
the parties in order that the true 
understanding of the parties as 
to the agreement may be reached. 
Such writings are to be read on 
the assumption that the course of 
prior dealings between the par-
ties and the usages of trade were 
taken for granted when the docu-
ment was phrased. Unless care-
fully negated they have become 
an element of the meaning of the 
words used. Similarly, the 
course of actual performance by 
the parties is considered the best 
·indication of what they intend-
ed the writing to mean. 
3. Under paragraph (b) con-
sistent additional terms, not re-
duced to writing, may be proved 
unless the court finds that the 
writing was intended by both par-
ties as a complete and exclusive 
B-1 
statement of all the terms. If 
the additional terms are auch 
that, if agreed upon, they would 
certainly have been included in 
the document in the view of the 
court, then evidence of their al-
leged making. must be kept from 
the trier of fact. 
Official camient to U::C § 2-207 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: Sections 1and3, Uniform 
Sales Act. 
Changes: Completely rewritten 
by this and other sections of this 
Article. 
Purposes of Changes: 
1. This section is intended to 
deal witli two typical situations. 
The one is the written confirma-
tion, ~·here an agreement has been 
reached either orally or by in-
formal correspondence between 
the parties and is followed by one 
or both of the parties sending for-
mal memoranda embodying the 
terms so far as agreed upon and 
adding terms not discussed. 'The 
<other situation is offer and accept-
ance, in which a wire or letter ex-
pressed and intended as an ac-
ceptance or the closing of an 
agreement adds further minor 
suggestions or proposals such as 
"ship by Tuesday," "rush," "ship 
draft against bill of lading inspec-
tion allowed," or the like. A fre-
quent example of the second situa-
tion is the exchanl!'e of printed 
purchase order and acceptance 
(sometimes called "acknowledg-
ment") forms. Because the forms 
are oriented to the thinking of the 
i·espective draftinl!' parties, the 
terms contained in them often do 
not correspond. Often the seller's 
form contains terms different 
from or additional to thos" set 
forth in the buyer's form. Xe»-
erthcless. the 1mrties proceed with 
the trnns:iction. [Comment 1 was 
amended in 1966.] 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Official Carrnent to UCC §2-207 (cont'd) 
2. Undor this Article a pro-
posed deal which in commercial 
understanding has in fact been 
closed is recognized as a contract. 
Therefore, any additional matter 
contained in the confirmation 01· 
in the acceptance falls within sub-
section (2) and must be 1·e1rnrdcd 
as a proposal for an added term 
unless the acceptance is made con-
ditional on the acceptance of the 
additional or different terms. 
[Comment 2 was amended in 
1966.] 
3. Whether or not additional 
or different terms will become 
part of the agreement depends 
upon the provisions of subsec-
tion (2). If they arc such as 
materially to alter the original 
bargain, they will not be includ-
ed unless expressly agreed to by 
the other party. If, however, 
they are terms which would not 
so change the bargain they will 
be incorporated unless notice of 
objection to them has already 
been given or is given within a 
reasonable time. 
4. Examples of typical claus-
es which would normally "mate-
rially alter" the contract and so 
result in surprise or hardshi1> if 
incorporated without express 
awareness by the other party 
are: • a clause negating auch 
·gtandard wananties as that of 
merchantability or fitness for a 
particular purpose in circum-
stances in which either warran-
ty normally attaches; a clause 
requiring ~ guaranty of 90 % or 
100~ deliveries in a case such 
as a contract by cannery, where 
the usage of the u·adc allows 
g-reater quantity leeways; a 
,clause reserving to the seller the 
power to cancel upon the buyer's 
failure to meet any invoice when 
due; a clause requiring that 
complaints be made in a time 
materially shorter than custom-
. ary or 1·easonable. 
B-2 
5. Examples of clauses 
which in\•olve no element of un-
1·easonable surprise and which 
therefore are to be incorporated 
in the contract unless notice of 
objection is seasonably given 
are: a clause setting forth and 
perhaps enlnrging slightly upon 
the seller's exemption due to eu-
pe1·vening causes beyond his 
control, similar to those covered 
by the provision of this Article 
on merchant's excuse by failure 
of presupposed conditions or a 
clause fixing in advance any rea-
sonable formula of proration un-
der such circumstances; a 
clause fixing a reasonable time 
for complaints within custom-
ary limits, or in the case of a pur-
chase for sub-sale, providing for 
inspection by the sub-purchaser; 
a clause pro\·iding for interest 
on overdue invoices or fixing the 
seller's standard credit terms 
where they are within the range 
of trade practice and do not lim-
it any credit bargained for; a 
clause limiting the right of re-
jection for defects Which fall 
within the customary trade tol-
erances· for acceptance "with ad-
justment" or otherwise limiting 
remedy in a reasonable manner 
(see Sections 2-718 and 2-719). 
G. If no answer is received . 
within a reasonable time after ad•· 
ditional terms are proposed, it is 
both fair and commercially sound 
to assume that their inclusion has 
been assented to. _Where clauses 
on confirming forms sent by both 
parties conflict each party must be· 
assumed to object to a clause of 
the other conflicting with one on 
the confirmation sent by himself. 
As a result the requirement that 
there be notice of objection which 
is found in subsection (2) is satis-
fied and the conflicting terms do 
not become a part of the con tract. 
The contract then consists of the 
terms originally expressly agreed 
to, terms on which the confirma-
tions agree, and terms supplied by 
this Act, including subsection (2). 
The written confirmation is also 
subject to Section 2-201. Under 
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Official Carrnent to UCC § 2-207 (cont'd) 
that section a failure to respond 
permits enforcement of a prior 
oral agreement; under this sec-
tion a failure to respon'd permits 
additional terms to become part of 
the agreement. [Comment 6 was 
amended in 1966.] 
7. In many cases, as where 
goods are shipped, accepted and 
paid for before any dispute aris-
es, there is no question whether 
a contract has been made. In such 
cases, where the writings of the 
parties do not establish a contract, 
it is not necessary to determine 
which act or document constituted 
the offer and which the accept-
ance. See Section 2-204. The 
only question is what terms are in-
cluded in the contract, and subsec-
tion ( 3) furnishes the governing 
rule. [Comment 7 was added in 
1966.] 
Official Ccxrment to UCC § 2-208 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: No such general provision 
but concept of this section rec-
ognized by terms such as 
"course of dealing", .,the cir-
cumstances of the case," "the 
conduct of the parties," etc., in 
Uniform Sales Act. 
Purposes: 
1. The parties themselves 
know best what they have meant 
by their words of agreement and 
their action under that agree-
ment is the best indication of 
what that meaning was. This 
section thus rounds out the set 
of factors which determines the 
meaning of the "agreement" and 
therefore also of the "unless 
otherwise agreed" qualification 
to various provisions of this Ar-
ticle. 
2. Under this section a 
course of performance is always 
relevant to determine the mean-
B-3 
ing of the agreement. · Express 
mention '.of course' of perform-
ance elsewhere .fu. this.:Artiele 
carries. ·nci ci>ntrai;. · 1mp1ication 
when there ,. a fail~re.10 refer 
to it in other sections. . ' 
3. Where it is difficult ·to de-
termine whether a particular act 
merely sheds light on the mean-
ing of the agreement or repre-
sents a waiver of a term of the 
agreement, the preference is in 
favor of "waiver" whenever 
such construction, plus the ap-
plication of the provisions on 
the reinstatement of rights 
waived (see Section 2-209), ia 
needed to preserve the flwble 
character of commercial con-
tracts and to prevent surprise or 
other hardship. 
4. A single occasion of coJi.. 
duct does not fall within the 
language of this section but oth-
er sections such as the ones on 
silence after acceptance and 
failure to specify particular de-
fects can affect the parties' 
rights on a single occasion (see 
Sections 2-606 and 2-607). 
Official Carrnent to UCC § 2-710 
Prior Uniform Statutory Pro\·i-
sion: See Sections 64 and 70, 
Uniform Sales Act. 
Purposes: To authorize reim-
bursement of the seller for ex-
penses reasonably incurred by 
him as a result of the buyer's 
breach. The section sets forth 
the principal normal and neces-
sary additional elements of dam-
age flowing from the bre:ich but 
intends to allow all commercial-
ly reas•mablc expenditures made 
by the seller. 
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